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Not only  is it hazardous to characterize an  inward-oriented
country as interventionist and an outward-oriented country as
liberal, but the characterization is simply wrong for developing
countries. Whether a country intervenes does not tell the whole
story about its trade policy, and misses an essential aspect of
intervention: which goods are fLvored  by subsidies and which
are protected by tariffs.
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In the debate about the relationship between  outward orientation implies incentives to export
trade policy and growth,various mcasures for  that are greater than incentives for import
trade intervention hiave  been used, Aitken  substitution. The two may be related but a
presents a new mcasure based on a country s  hcavily interx  cntionist policy could be outiA  ardly
relative price structure and the structure of  oriented.
relative world prices. This measure, hc argues,
conforms more closely than existing measures to  And a country could impose trade policies
thc conccpt of tradc intervention.  that raise the (zverage  incentive to export, while
incredsing the dispersion of incentives wvithin the
rhe relationship between "opetness"  and  export and import sectors  - so that when such a
trade liberalization is more complicated than is  c*,"itry liberaliies. tradc  iiighlt  return to its
often believed.  Whether a country intervenes  original pattern hut with incentives inwardly
does not tell the whole storv about its trade  oricnted.
policy, .nd  misscs an essential aspect of inter-
vention: whichi  goods arc f'avored  by subsidies  The index of rclative price dispersion that
and wihich  are protected by tariffs. Indonesia and  Aitken develops has the advantage that it is
Peru, for example, havc comparable moasurcs of  objective, measures intervention in both exports
intervention, but the relative price of cquipment  and imports, is comparable across countries, and
is very high in Pcru and vcr)  low in Indoncsia:  is indepcndenit  of fluctuations in exchange rates
consumer nondurables appear to flow freely in  caused by macroeconomic mismanagement.
Latin America, while prices for these goods in  Unlike average tariffs and mcasures of nontariff
Japan and Korca are inexplicably high. tJnder-  barriers and price levels, the relative pricc
standing differences in the growth expericnce of  dispersion index measures incentive distortions
these countries clearly requires a more subtle  within categories of goods.
view of trade policy than "outward" and "in-
ward" orientation, and a more informed under-  The Leamer index looks directly at the
standing of the nature of intervention.  cffects of trade policy in!ervention. hut the
theoretical assumptions required to calculate the
The debate has been confused by the f;ailurc  pattem of trade in the absence of distortion are
to distinguish between tradc intervenition  and  questionable. Such assumptions are unnecessary
outward orientation. Trade intervention implies  when calculating relative pricc dispersion, as
policics that distort the flow or pattem of trade:  world prices are directly observable.
The  Policy  Rescarch  Workirng  Paper  Series  diserninate the  finding of uA  ork under  \u  a) in  the Bank An ohbcctive  of the  serics
is to get these findingc  out quickiy,  e'en  if presevrtitiomn  aie lcss tian-  fullh polished.  The findings,  intr pretationi, and
conclusions  in these  papers  do not neces'sarily  reprsent official  Bank  Ix)cy.
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ati(l  Lanti  PritcliettIn the  debate  over the  relationship  between  trade  policy ana  growth,  a variety  of measures  of
trade  intervention  have  been  used.  In  this  paper,  I present  a  new  measure  based  on  differences
between  a  country's  relative  price  structure  and  the  structure  of world relative  prices,  and  argue
that  this  measure conforms more closely than  exisir1g measures  to the concept of trade  intervention.
Trade  policy  debate  has  been  confused by  the failure  to distinguish  outward  orientation  from
trade  intervention.  Trade  intervention  impl:es policies which  distort  the  flow or pattern  of trade
(Edwards,  1989), while outward  orientation  implies that  tiLe  incentives  to  export  are  greater  than
the  incentives  to  import  substitute  (Kreuger,  1978).  Trade  intervention  is often  associated  with
outward  orientation  because  the two may  in fac  be correlated:  a restr:ctively  interventionist  trade
regime can bias production  against exports  through  an appreciated  exchange  rate  (see Appendix).
However, a  highly  interventionist  trade  policy  that  balances  import  restrictions  with  export  in-
centives  may  be as  "outwardly  oriented"  as completely  liberalized  economy.  Also, A country  may
impose  trade  policies which raise the  average incentive to export  relative  to import  substitute  while
increasing  the  dispersion of incentives  within the import  and  export  sectors.  When such a country
liberalizes,  trade  may return  to its original pattern  but  with  incentives inwardly oriented.
Since intervention  and  outward  orientation  are distinct,  an empirical  relationship  between  out-
ward  orientation  and  growth does not imply the same relationship  exists between intervention  and
growth.  To test  the  effects of trade  intervention  on  growth  separate  from  the  effects of outward
orientation,  one needs  a satisfactory  cross-country  measure  of trade  intervention.  The four  most
widely  used measures  of trade  policy have been  trade  intensity,  average  tariffs and  coverage ratio
3of NTB's,  deviations  in a  country's  trade  pattern  from  that  predicted  by its  factor  endowments,
and  distortions  in the  real price level.
1  Problems  with  Commonly  Used  Trade  Policy  Measures
1.1  trade  intensity
Trade  intensity,  defined  for country  j  as
Li  =  GD P  M)(1 
"  GDPj
(with Xj  being exports  and  AlIj  imports)  is used as an indication  of trade  policy. A related  measure,
import  penetration.  is defined
Lj  =  MP  (2)
GDP,
These measures  are often adjusted  for "structural"  factors by regressing the numerator  of equation  1
or 2 on country  specific variables  such as area, income level, and  CIF/FOB  ratios,  and  redefining
the measure  as
Lj=  D  (3)
GDP,
with rj  being  the residual  from the  regression.
Trade  intensities  and  import  penetration  ratios,  whether  adjusteC  for  "structural"  factors  or
not,  are  simply  not  measures  of  trade  intervention.  A  high  trade  share  or  import  share  may
characterize  either  a  liberal  regime or an  interventionist  regime  in  trade  balance  with  significant
export  subsidies  (see the  model in the  appendix).  Trade  share  is even unconvincing  as a  measure
of outward  orientation;  it is notoriously  unstable  across  time  as well as across countries,  more  so
4than  can believably  be attrihuted  to  tra3e  strategy1.
1.2  adjusted  price  level
A second trade  policy iaeasure  interprets  the deviation  of the aggregate  price level of country  j  (pj
expressed  in dollars)  relative  to the United  States (PUJ)  from the level predicted  by the  "structural"
relationship  (with  yj being  income per  capita  also in dollars)
__  =  1 +yj  +fj  (4)
PUJ
as a  distortion  reflecting  trade  policy  (Dollar,  1990).  A country's  price level contains  a nontraded
price  v hich  differs systematicallv  across  countries  with  income,  and  a  traded  price,  which  differs
from  world prices only  through  trade  policy restrictions.  Increases  in import  restrictions  can raise
the price level of the economy by raising  both the price of imported  goods and  of nontraded  goods,
biasing  production  against  exports  (see  Appendix).  But  bhe resulting  index  does  not  measure
intervention  directly  for  the  same  reasor  as the  trade  share;  interventions  designed  to  keep  the
average  tariff  low while increasing the  variance of traded  goods prices  will lower  the price  level.  A
low price  level can be maintained  even with a  high average import  tariff  if exports  are  taxed.  In
this  case  the  "adjusted"  price  level would fail as a measure  of outward  orientation  as well; a  low
price  level would  be associated  with  a trade  regime  biased toward  producing  import  substituting
goods.
Il  hi-  Heinr  IPIIt II  fi nd, t hat Kor(a.  for * xami  pIIe-  ivenit fromi all export  'Itare of (;DP  of WX to  3W/ o%er  a t velItY
e-ar  laerloa
51.3  administrati  - measures
Administrative measures of trade regime include average tariffs and the percent of traded products
covered by NTB's.  These measures reveal nothing about intervention in the export sector, and
neither  are precise measures of the  effect policy intervention on the flow of trade.  The most
important trade restriction for developing  countries is import licensing,  a restriction which is highly
discretionary; a strictly enforced licensing requirement on one good could be more restrictive yet
result in a lower coverage  ratio than several goods  with unenforced  requirements. Average tariffs for
imiported  goods fail as intervention measures by ignoring the dispersion of tariffs within a categorv
of goods. Also, the two measures are not complementary; replacing a NTB with a high tariff as is
common in liberalizing coLntries increases one measure of intervention while decreasing the other.
1.4  quantity  measures
One can determine the seriousDess  of policy intervention by measuring the degree to which trade
patterns  are distorted froni those occurring in the absence of intervention.  Such a  measure has
the advantage of determining the effects  of intervention, thus avoiding  many of the problems with
administrative measures. But the "normal" pattern  of trade which would occur in the absence of
intervention is not observable, and some theoretical assumptions must be imposed to recover this
pattern.
Leamer (1989) measures deviations of actual trade patterns  from those predicted by the coun-
try's  endowment using a Hecksher-Ohlin  factor intensity model. Although the most theoreticaLly
grounded of the measures of intervention, this index suffers from its reliance on a theory which
has had questionable empirical success. In practice, the three intervention measures calculated by
Leamer are only mildly correlated with one other (having rank correlations between 20 and 30
6percent),  suggesting  the  index should be treated  with  caution.
Since all these measures  are emphasizing  different aspects  of trade  strategy,  it would be surpris-
ing if they  were correlated  with one another.  Indeed  they are not.  In a recent paper,  Pritchet  (1991)
searches  for correlations  between  the  measures  described  above, and  finds a "complete  absence  of
correlation  among  them".  While  Harrison  (1991) finds  that  the  relationship  improves  when  trade
policy measures  are observed  over time.  the  correlation  remains  weak.  Measures commonly  used
to describe  trade  regime cannot  all be characterizing  the same aspect  of trade  policy  intervention.
If intervention  is defined in terms of its effects on trade  flows, one can measure intervention  either
by observing trade  patterns  deviating  from non-intervention  patterns,  as was discussed above, or by
measuring  deviations  of relative  prices from world relative  prices; in the  absence  of price  controls,
any  "distortion"  in the  pattern  of trade  will also result  in a  deviation  of relative  prices  from  the
non-intervention  price  structure.  While  measures  based  on  relative  price  distortions  share  the
advantage  quantity  measures  have of focusing  on  the  effects of intervention,  relative  price-based
measures  have  the  added  advantage  that  prices  in  the  absence  of trade  distortions  are  directly
observed in the world economy; provided there  are no other  major  barriers  to price arbitrage  across
countries  (such  as  transportation  costs  and  nionopolies  in  the  distribution  of goods),  and  after
allowing  for systematic  differences across  countries in the  cost of distributing  goods,  the prices  for
traded  goods observed  in an economy in the absence  of trade  barriers  will equal  the world prices.
Helleiner  argues  "there  is usually  no escape from difficult and  costly product-by-product  com-
parisons  of domestic  and  world  prices  in  search  of 'tariff  equivalents"'  (1990).  In  this  paper  I
perform  such  a  comparison,  nieasuring  directly  the  degree  to  which policy  intervention  distorts
7the  incentives  within the  traded  sector.  I will not be measurirg  the  effects of intervention  on  the
average Price of traded  goods relative  to nontraded  goods, as these effects are captured  in measures
of deviations  of the  price level; an import  tariff  on some goods which does not change  the average
tariff  will distort  relative  prices from world prices but will not raise the  price  level, while a uniform
tariff  on  imports  matched  by  a uniform  subsidy  on exports  will not distort  incentives  within  the
traded  sector  but  will raise  the  price level (see Dollar,  1990, and  the  appendix).
2  A  Model  of  Relative  Price  Dispersion
Consumption  in the economy is divided between one nontraded  and n traded  goods.  Prik  arbitrage
in traded  goods assures  that  the  domestic  price of a traded  good  can deviate  from  the  world price
only through  trade  intervention.  The log domestic dollar price in dollars  of traded  good i in country
j  is
p,j  = Pi  + eij  (5)
where  Pi' is the international  price of the produced  good and  eij represents  the impact  of the  policy
intervention  (an  import  restriction  or an expo:t  subsidy).
Traded  goods,  whether  produced  at  home or  imported,  are  not  consumed  in  their  produced
form, but can only be consumed after being "distributed".  Goods are transformed  into "distributed
goods"  using a Leontieff production  technology, where the inputs  are the produced  good and a fixed
service requirement  (the nontraded  good) per unit of the  distributed  good.  If goods are distributed
with a constant  marginal  product  in nontraded  services, and if distribution  is perfectly  competitive,
8then  the log of the  dollar  price of distributed  good  i in country  j  will be
Pij  = Pi  + e,j  + ailogPN,  (6)
where  PNj  is the  domestic  rontraded  goods price  in dollars and  as is the unit  service requirement.
I assuine  the service requirenient  i,. the distribution  of goods can vary across goods,  but not across
countries.  The last assumption  is for exposition;  the results of this  section hold provided the service
requirement  in distribution  moves mionotonically with the  service price.
To allow for the possibility  of nominal stickiness  in the  face on  a nominal  exchange rate  fluctu-
ations.  equation  6 can be expressed
p,j  = P,' + Eij + ai(logPNj  - logej)  (7)
where  PNj  is the  domestic  currency  price  of nontraded  goods and  e is the  nominal  exchange  rate
expressed  in dollars  per  unit  of domestic  currency.
According to equation  7, differences in prices of distributed  goods from world production  prices
(P,')  are  caused  by  the  nontraded  service component  required  to  distribute  the  good,  changes  in
the exchange  rate  (to the  extent  of nominal  price stickiness),  and  trade  distortions  Ejj
2 .
The effect of policy on  prices can be isolated by  subtracting  the average distributed  price  from
the distributed  price pij in equation  7, and  comparing  this difference to the world price.  Subtracting
2 "t1her  io'-ible  differfllcf-'.  such  a, are'  callpds  bY  iiio;iolpoli&s  :iii Itli distributioti  of goods  il ill  ot be rotisidletf(l
here  If di-triluimioii  inoiiooljte  are tiot niatural  mItompolIits.  liit  are catised  li.  tradle polices.  tite resltidiig price
dlitortion-  cral  1w  laflelv  attrillullu  to  Inti(nvlitiou  E,.
9the mean  distributed  price  gives the  relative distributed  price
p-j  - pj = P,' - Pi + E 1j  - ej + (a, - a)(logPNj  - logej)  (8)
where  p,,  P,  fj  and  a  are average values across goods within a country.  The relative  distributed
price  will be influenced  by  the exchange  rate  if nontraded  prices adjust  slowly and  the  nontraded
service requirement  of the gcod  differs from the average.
Since  world  prices  for  "produced"  goods  a1e not  directly  observable,  I  subtract  the  relative
distributed  price  defined  in eqtlation  8 for the  United  States  from the  relative  price for  country  j
3
Pij = pij - Pj-  (Pius  - prrs) =  (,j  - Ej-(,us  - eus) + (a, - d)(logPNj  - logej  - logPNus)  (9)
or rearranging  terms
pij  Ai + (ai - a)log-  ^j  +  Eij  - e}  (10)
where  A,  is defined
A,  eZUs  - EUCs  - (ai - d)logPNus
If  Ai  and  ai  - a  could  be  identified,  the  effects of intervention  on  price  (the  term  fij  - fj  in
equation  10) could be isolated.  This  term represents  the deviation  of the  relative production  price
of good  i in country  j  from world relative production prices.
Jln  t  e estinatiot,  t  he  veigfIlte(  average  of relative Price' in OF:(  countrie'  vnb .i,hstitnitvd  for  the price in  the
l  iiitedi States,  lout thie result.,  %v-r- itot  cianged.
103  Relati--e  Price  Estimation
Although  I do not  observe  Ai and  ai  - a directly,  I can estimate  them  with  cross-country  regres-
gions performed  for each  good  i.  The  data  used for estimation  are  dra''n  from  the  last  phase  of
the  Incomes  Comparison  Project,  which consists  of goods prices relative  to  the  United  States  for
151 traded  and  nontraded  goods based  on  detailed  price  and  expenditure  data  from  a  cross sec-
tion  of 57 countries  in  1980 (Kravis,  Heston and  Summers,  1982; United  Nations,  1986).  In order
to  ensure  the  plausibility  of the  assumption  that  a,  is the  same  across countries,  I aggregate  the
original  151 traded  a.'  nontraded  goods to a sam1ple  of 16 traded  goods and  one nontraded  good
(see table  1)4.  Prices were comiputed for these 16 traded  goods and  two nontraded  goods  (rent  and
services/construction)  as the  expenditure-weighted  averages  of the original  151 prices.  Extensive
efforts have  been  made  in producing  these  data  to  control for cross-country  differences in quality
such that  prices are comnpared  for the  same good  across countries.
3.1  bias  from  the  impact  of  intervention  on  nontraded  prices
If the  dollar  price  of nontraded  goods in country  j  is influenced  by  the  average  policy  distortion
cj,  then  estimating  equation  10 using  nontraded  prices as  an  explanatory  variable  wiU bias  the
estimates  of ai - a.  The  relationship  between  nontraded  prices  and  average  tariffs  and  subsidies
in long run  equilibrium  is described  in a  detailed  model  in the appendix,  but  will be summarized
here.  An  increase  in  the  average  import  tariff  or export  subsidy  shifts  production  towards  the
4edIlc  ation  andl health  care  werr d  ropped fro:mi  esti iiationi  to avoidl the  lifficiilties  of cross-coo o  rv  qualit,  cotm-
parisoins  in  these gooks.
11Table  1: Traded  Goods  Categories  and  World Expenditure  Shares
Consumer  Goods:  Capital  Goods:
Good  Share  Good  Share
Food  0.30  Transportation  0.04
Tobacco  & Beverage  0.07  Machines  0.08
Clothing  0.10  Agr.  Machines  0.01





Auto  Parts  0.05
Recreate  - Durable  0.03
Recreate  - Nondur  0.02
Government  0.09
Other  0.01
traded  (import  competing  or exporting)  sector while at  the  same  time  increasing the  demand  for
and  decreasing  the  production  of nontraded  goods.  The excess demand  for nontraded  goods must
be rationed  with an increase  in the price of nontraded  goods.  The increase is less than  the  increase
in the  policy measure  since both  supply and  demand  respond  to an  increase in nonltraded  prices.
This  relationship  introduces  a potential  bias  into  the estimation  of equation  10. If the  average
distortion  ej increases from a uniform increase  in fij  across goods,  then  e,j  - cj remains  orthogonal
to PNi.  If however distortions  are concentrated  on some goods,  then ai - a  would be overestimated
for  those  goods for  which  E,, - f  increased  and  underestimated  for  the  goods for  which  eij - eJ
decreased.
Estimation  bias can  be avoided  by estimating  in two stages;  since service costs  (mostly  labor)
are  predicted  to  vary  systematically  with  wages across  countries,  I  first  regress  each  of the  two
nontraded  prices  (in dollars)  on  income and  income squared  per  worker (also  in dollars)  derived
from  Summers  and  Heston.  The  predicted  values of these  prices are now independent  of the error
term,  and  can be used to estimate  a,  - d in equation  10.
123.2  comparing  price  distortion  between  countries  with  different  incomes
While it is not likely that  the average level of distortion eJ greatly affects income per capita,  if
countries with low income levels are more likely to have high average distortion levels, then using
income per worker as an instrument for nontraded prices may bias estimates of ai - a.  Erzan et al
find that  in 1985  average tariffs were between 50 and 66 percent for countries with GDP per capita
less then $500  and between 3 and 5 percent for countries with GDP per capita greater than $5000.
NTB's coverage  ratios were found to be highest among middle income countries 5.
If indeed low and  middle income countries have higher average distortion levels than upper
income countriOs 6. then the measured d.stortions in low  and middle income countries will  understate
the true price distortions, and estimates of a, - a will be biased.
The importance of this bias in comparing price distortions for two countries will increase with
the difference  in the countries' income levels. Let ei, be the estimated error eij - ej,  let A3,  be the
estimated a, - a and ,30  be the true a, - a.  Comparisons  of the relative distortion for good i between
countries j  and k can be expressed as the difference
e;,  - e;*  =_!,  - e,)  - (fik  - 0)]  - (X3  - 1 30)(Yj - Yk)  (11)
where y, is the nontraded price predicted by per capita income in country j  and  Yk is the same
in country k.  According to equation 11, the estimated difference  between two countries of price
distortion equals the true difference  plus a bias which increases with the difference  in nontraded
5 kierage tariff lefelc  mid,ir'tatv  Ilic Impiiortalice  of tra(de  harrier' il  de floleld  ronninrie,:  tarifR are amonig  tfie
least  llill  ort:otit harriers  to t rathI- wit Imii I it  (  . Ilext  to  ailmni,iit  rafile  hbarritr'.  tecIntiical  rfeitIatioiis.  atiid fronlier
lelav,s,e  LEitersont  et al.  I 14X)
61  nles  thie lhigher aerage  distortion  ,I  catiseuI  h\  tiniforiiil!  hiilger di'tortion'  e,,  for all  goo(d.  leavilig  .,  -,
constant  s(ee abio%e}  Ezran  t  a  t  a  1187. for  example.  fotnid( thlat  for  (levelopling  coniittrie,  average  tariff  levek were
rottghll  tie  samiie  for  food  aiiti  for  iiia,.-ifacture,.
13prices  predicted  by  income.  While  estimated  price  distortions  in Paraguay  may  be  comparable
with  estimated  price  distortions  in  Peru,  caution  should  be  used  in  comparing  these  estimated
price distortions  with those of Denmark.  For this  reason, comparisons  are made  within three  broad
income  categories.  As a  further  precaution,  price  dispersion  was measured  both  over  the  entire
sample  of countries,  and  over a  restricted  sample which  only considers  countries  in  the  high  and
middle  income groups  (eliminating  India  and  most of Africa).
3.3  estimation
Since population  densitv  and  urbanization  are  likely inputs  in the  distribution  of goods and  may
affect  relative  prices. I include these  variables in the price regressions.  As indicated  in equation  10,
changes in the exchange rate  can influence  relative  prices if nontraded  prices are sticky.  To control
for this  I include  the log of the exchange  rate  in the year  1980 (the year  of the ICP  sample)  minus
the  log of the average exchange rate  over the previous  ten years (defined  as exzrate.).
Deviations  from world  production  prices are  estimated  using  the  following equation  for  each
good  i
P,J =  A, + 13 1rent-p,  +  32service&pj + /3 3 log urban,  +  034logdensity,  + )3 5ex.ratej  + tiij  (12)
where  rent-P,  is the log rent price  predicted  by log income per  worker, service4Pj  is the  log service
and  :onstruction  price predicted  by  log income per  worker, and  ex-ratej  is described  above.  I use
the  residual  ,ij from the  estimation  of equation  12 as an estimate  of E,j - -,,  the  deviation  of the
relative  price of good i in country  j  from the  world relative  price.
143.4  relative  price  estimation  results
The results of the estimation  of equation  12 on the restricted  sample (low income countries  excluded)
are  given in  table  2.  Including  Low income countries  reduces the  percentage  variation  of relative
prices explained  by the  dependent  variables, but  does not  change the magnitude  of the  coefficients
significantly.  High nontraded  goods prices substantially  increase the price of consumer  nondurables
relative  to capital  goods and  consumer durables;  a 1 percent  increase in service prices increases  the
relative  price of clothing by 0.7 percent  while decreasing  the relative  price of electrical  equipment  by
O.9K  percent.  This suggests the  distribution  of consumer nondurables  is much niore  labor  intensive
than  the  distribution  of capital  goods.  Capital  goods  are also relatively  cheaper  in areas  of high
population  density, a result  suggesting  lower (Listribution costs in these areas.
High  rent prices have a tendency  to decrease prices for capital  and  consumer  nondurable  goods
relative  to  consumer  durables,  but  the  effects are not  uniform  across all  goods;  the  effect  of rent
prices may  reflect higher inventory  requirements  in the  distribution  of consumer  durables.  A tem-
porary  depreciation  of the  exchange  rate  lowers  the  price  of consumer  nondurables  relative  to
consumer  durables  and  capital  goods.  This is the predicted  response if exchange  rate  changes  pass
through  to  prices more  slowly for capital  and  consumer  durable  goods,  where  products  are  more
likely to be differentiated.
4  Computing  Relative  Price  Dispersion
As  indicated  above,  the  residual  from  the  estimation  of equation  12  for good  i  represents  the
deviation  of the  relative  price  of good  i for country  j  from  the  world relative  price.  To derive  a
single measure  (V)  of the  degree to  whi, i relative  prices in  country  j  differ from  world  prices,  I
15Table  2: Explaining  Differences in Relative  Prices  Across C'ountries
pij =  A,  + i3 rent  pj  + 13 2sertice  pj  + /33  log urban,  + /34 log densityj  + i35ezratej  + i7ij
Pi,  is the  log price  of traded  good  i in country  j  relative  to the  expenditure  weighted  sum of all
traded  prices in country  j,  minus  the  same relative  price of good  i in the  United  States.
Independent  variables  are explained  in the  text  describing  equation  12.
Good  Coefficient on  the Independent  Variable  r-squared
service-p.  rent-P.  log densityj  log urbanj  ex-rate,
Food  0.31  -0.20  0.006  0.037  0.34  0.41
(2.1)  (1.1)  (0.4)  (0.6)  (2.0)
Tobacco  & Beverage  -0.075  0.112  0.008  -0.182  0.16  0.17
(0.2)  (0.3)  (0.3)  (1.5)  (0.4)
Clothing  0.72  -0.28  -0.08  -0.04  -0.07  0.43
(3.0)  (0.9)  (3.0)  (0.3)  (0.2)
Fuel  0.70  -0.50  0.106  0.047  0.007  0.16
(1.0)  (0.6)  (1.4)  (0.2)  (0.0)
Household  0.56  -0.14  0.006  -0.200  0.52  0.16
(1.8)  (0.4)  (0.2)  (1.5)  (1.4)
Appliance  -0.31  0.54  0.077  -0.218  -0.29  0.24
(0.8)  (1.2)  (1.9)  (1.3)  (0.7)
Autos  -1.04  2.08  0.034  -0.003  -0.20  0.32
(2.1)  (3.2)  (0.7)  (0.0)  (0.4)
Auto  Parts  -0.644  0.934  0.049  0.153  -0.408  0.16
(2.0)  (2.3)  (1.4)  (1.1)  (1.1)
Recreate-Durable  -0.50  0.030  -0.074  0.147  -0.190  0.19
(1.4)  (0.1)  (1.9)  (0.9)  (1.4)
Recreate-Nondur  0.441  -0.224  -0.078  -0.087  0.62  0.14
(1.2)  (0.5)  (1.9)  (0.5)  (1.4)
Other  -0.517  1.08  -0.021  0.087  0.071  0.19
(1.7)  (2.8)  (0.7)  (0.7)  (0.2)
Government  0.271  -0.047  -0.012  0.036  -0.018  0.31
(1.5)  (0.2)  (0.6)  (0.9)  (0.1)
Transportation  -0.598  -0.528  -0.054  0.086  -0.85  0.40
(1.6)  (1.2)  (1.4)  (0.6)  (2.0)
Machines  -0.137  -0.927  -0.014  0.095  -0.216  0.48
(0.6)  (3.3)  (0.6)  (1.0)  (0.8)
Agricult.  Mach.  -0.215  -0.350  -0.162  -0.152  -1.00  0.40
(0.6)  (0.6)  (3.5)  (0.8)  (2.0)
Elec.  Equipment  -0.953  0.192  0.023  0.286  -0.905  0.28
(2.7)  (0.4)  (0.6)  (1.9)  (1.8)  . -
t-statistics  in parentheses
Coefficients from estimation  on the  restricted sample
16square  the deviations  for each good i and  country j  and sum the  magnitudes  across all goods
(13) 1'  9  772  =  (~tij(,E.j  _  ej)2  13
where c,,  is the expenditure  share predicted  by a cross country  regression of expenditure  on income
and  income squared7. The index V  , represents  the degree to which relative  prices in country  j  differ
from world  relative  prices.
4.1  relative  price  dispersion  across  countries
C'ountry rankings  of intervention  according  to the price  dispersion measure  are listed  in table  3 by
income category.  The dispersion  categories  in  the  table  3 are  defined  such that  a country  in the
"low dispersion"  categorv, for example,  has a dispersion  which is low relative  to those in its income
category.  Among  the  middle  income  countries  with  high  dispersion  are  Sri Lanka,  Bolivia,  and
Portugal.  Low dispersion  economies  include  Pakistan,  the  Dominican  Republic,  and  Costa  Rica.
In the  high income group,  Japan,  Israel,  and  Spain have high  dispersion,  while Austria  and  Italy
have relatively  low dispersion.  For the  low income countries,  Nigeria,  Zambia,  and  India  are high,
while Madagascar  and  Kenya are  low.
The results  listed  in table  3 are separated  by income categories  for reasons  given in section 3.2:
the bias in comparing  dispersion in different countries increases  with the difference in the countries'
income per  capita  (see equation  11).  The numbers  given are  the  calculated  index  values Vj, and
represent  the  variance  across goods  of differences in relative  prices from  world relative  prices;  for
7\cit  al  t  ,  (\nldlit tirt  sIiare(-  \ '%rt'  al-o  ti'dI  rl  P( rt  alilt  Port iial  oi%%  0ottit(  liat  le-  prle  di'p,er'.ion  if Itheir  actttal
expeniilitllre  lihare. are  ited  i  In  dX\  va, a ko  calt-tilated  it  iitg  the  'li  mn  of  thle  absolute  t'alues  of(  lthe resi(litals.  Thle
re-,IIltitig  I1ldeL  wah  lii.ll  correl,t-al  ti'W  ra%%. 14'I  V  ranki)  i lii  Ihie  vitni  of  the sq(uares  of  (lhe re"iduals.
17Table  3: Relative  Price  Dispersion  Within  Income  Categories
Middle  Income  Countries
Low  Medium Low  Medium High  High
Panama  0.0372  Korea  0.0496  Guatemala  0.0606  Sri Lanka  0.102
Argentina  0.0358  Greece  0.0460  Peru  0.0600  Bolivia  0.0863
Paraguay  0.0325  Columbia  0.0418  Chile  0.0555  Portugal  0.0828
Dominican  Rep.  0.0323  El Salvador  0.0416  Brazil  0.0546  Indonesia  0.0797
Costa Rica  0.0296  Ireland  0.0386  Ecuador  0.0530  Honduras  0.0749
Pakistan  0.0251  Venezuela  0.0374  Philippines  0.0522  Uruguay  0.0608
IMorocco  0.0164  Tunisia*  0.0704  Botswana  0.1246
Upper  Income  Countries
Belgium  0.0164  Norway  0.0218  Finland  0.0439  Japan  0.1368
France  0.0134  Luxembourg  0.0197  Canada  0.0358  Israel  0.1119
Italy  0.0119  Germany  0.0189  United  Kingdom  0.0319  Spain  0.0554
Austria  0.0050  Netherlands  0.0168  Denmark  0.0271
Lower  Income  Countries*
Mali  0.0250  Senegal  0.0317  Cameroon  0.0541  Nigeria  0.0947
Kenya  0.0211  Zimbabwe  0.0288  Ethiopia  0.0503  Zambia  0.0785
Madagascar  0.0184  Ivory  Coast  0.0286  Malawi  0.0378  India  0.0670
____________________  _______________________  Tanzania  0.0658
Intensities  of price  dispersion  are defined  within each income category
*  Based on index  estimated  over unrestricted  sample
18examnle  Brazil,  showing "medium  high"  dispersion in the middle  income sample,  has a variance  of
relative  prices  equal to  5.5 percent  of the mean  relative  price.
The results  for the middle and  upper  income groups were estimated  using the restricted  sample,
in  which  the  low income  countries  were not  included8. Including  low income  countries  does  not
change the  hierarchy  much for the  upper  income countries,  but changes the  hierarchy  considerably
for the  middle  income countries.  Capital  goods prices  are relatively  low for low and  high  income
groups,  and  relatively  high  for  middle  income  groups.  The  predicted  relative  price  of capital
declines  with  income  in  the  restricted  sample.  Including  low  income groups  in  the  estimation
flattens  the  price-income  relationship.  Since almost  all middle  income countries  have  high  capital
prices,  relatively  poor  countries  within  the  middle  income  group  show more  price  dispersion  in
the  unrestricted  sample;  particularly  Honduras,  Indonesia,  Pakistan,  and  Bolivia (the  estimation
results  for the  unrestricted  sample are also given in the appendix).
Within  middle  income countries,  Asia is slightly  more interventionist  than  Latin  America;  Asia
has  a  median  dispersion  index  of 0.051 versus  Latin  America  with  a  median  of 0.047.  Perhaps
more significant  is the high variance of dispersion measures  across Asia (Japan  and  Sri Lanka with
very  high  dispersion,  Pakistan  with  very low dispersion),  while the  variance  in Latin  America  is
relatively  low.
"The rankliiig,  in t able  3  for Rolt  wana.  Morocco.  and(i  Tuinnia  are based  on e-timat  ion  ovpr the ninre't  rictfd sam,ple.
Tlhe  (cutintrie  'ranikinig  are lreserN  el  ifgrouped  wvitIh  Ilieir  Africiln  peer,  in the low incomiie  (at egor.  Boitswana andi
Tinisia  show  lhiglI disper'ion  and(l  loroceo  sIiows  low  disper,ioii
( aniada  I'  onsid(lerablY  iniore (listorte(l  when  i*stimialed  u',ing  thie  tinreKtricled  aniple.  Tli-,  I,  plriniarilv  caused
1be a sIronger  e'timiat ed  cffect  of  (\xcha  ge  rale  apIpreciation  in  the  uinrestricte(d  -l  tiniation,. cothiniied  withIt (Canada
having a vignificanll  i  more  depreciated  vxchtange  rate  in  19SOlt  t  han  in  pre%ioll  Year,
194.2  equipment  price  distortions
Whether  a  country  intervenes  may  not be as important  to  growth as houw  the  country  intervenes.
Delong and  Summers  (1991) have emphasized  the relationship  between equipment  investment  and
growth,  arguing  that  a one percent  increase in equipment  investnient  increases growth by one third
of one  percent.  Intervention  which  subsidizes prices  of capital  goods in general  or equipment  in
particular  would encourage this  type  of investment.  Subsidies of capital  in}  iay also encourage
production  and  export  growth of manufactures  which use these  inputs.
The relative  price  regressions estimating  equation  12 allow cross-country  comparisons  of equip-
ment  price  distortions  fromn  the  world  relative  equipment  price.  Equipment  price  distortions  are
defined
Di  CtEaki0jk  (14)
k
where  k indexes equipment  goods (machines,  agricultural  machines. and  electrical equipment),  aijk
is the expenditure  share for each good, and 5,k  is the residual from regression in equation  12. Equip-
ment  price  distortions  can be  used as measures  of the  relative  incentives  to engage  in equipment
investment:  unusually  high relative  prices would discourage  investment  in equipment.  Categoriza-
tions by relative  price dispersion and equipment  price distortion  are listed in table 4, and  equipment
price distortion  measures  are g.ven ir  the appendix.  Relative  equipment  price distortions  vary sub-
stantially  across countries within each income category:  Korea, for example shows high intervention
and relative  equipment  prices 5.3 percent  below the predicted  level, while Peru,  having  comparable
levels of intervention,  shows relative  equipment  prices 2.2 percent  above the  predicted  level.
Within  middle  income  countries,  Asia has  significantly  lower  median  equipment  prices  than
Latin  America,  although  the  variance  of relative  equipment  prices is much higher  in  Asia mostly
20Table  4:  Relative  Equipment  Prices and  Relative  Price  Dispersion  Within  Income  Categories
D  j  -E  ajOknj
k
Middle  Income  Countries
Relative  Relative  Price  Dispersion
Equipment  Price  Low  Medium  High
Low  Pakistan  -0.0057  Greece  -0.0214  Bolivia  -0.0070
lrehand  -0.0094  Korea  -0.052e  Honduras  -0.0187
Botswana  -0.1177  Portugal  -0.0223
________________  Indonesia  -0.0251
Mediuiii  C'osta Rica  0.0072  Brazil  0.0102  UTruguay  -0.0053
Panama  -0.0022  El Salvador  0.0019
Paraguay  -0.0032  Philippines  -0.0044
Venezuela  -0.0037  Tunisia  -0.0010
_Morocco'  0.0050
High  Argentina  0.0249  Columbia  0.0320  Sri Lanka  0.0530
Dominican  Rep.  0.0228  Chile  0.0295  Peru  0.0223
Ecuador  0.0162  Guatemala  0.0197
UTpper  Income  Countries
Low  Norway  -0.0238  Finland  -0.0238
Denmark  -0.0296  Israel  -0.0352
________________  _______________________  ____________________  Japan  -0.0483
Medium  Italy  0.0090  Luxembourg  0.0140  United  Kingdom  0.0075
l_______________  Austria  0.0083  Canada  -0.0214
High  France  0.0211  Netherlands  0.0275  Spain  0.0150
. Belgium  0.0172  Germany  0.0144
Lower Inconme  Countries*
Low  Zimbabwe  -0.0218  Tanzania  -0.0289
Nigeria  -0.0334
Zambia  -0.0603
Medium  Kenya  -0.0089  Cameroon  0.0C75
Ivory  Coast  0.0065
Ethiopia  -0.0007
Malawi  -0.0053
High  Mali  0.0401  Senegal  0.0117  India  0.0106
Madagascar  0.0320
equipment  price  distortions  defined uwithin  income categories
* Based  on estimation  over the unrestricted  sample
21because  of high prices in Sri Lanka and  Philippines  and  low prices in Korea,  Japan,  Pakistan,  and
Indonesia9.
5  Comparing  Relative  Price  Dispersion  and  Measures  of  Out-
ward  Orientation
Combining  intervention  (the  0 .tortion  of trade  patterns)  and  outward  orientation  (the  incentives
to produce  for export  relative  to import  substitution)  into a single measure  of trade  policy is often
justified  on  the grounds  that  intervention  in the  form of import  restrictions  taxes  exports,  biasing
incentives  toward  the  production  of import  substitutez;  import  restrictions  shift  resources  towards
the import  production,  raising the prices of nontraded  goods relative  to the prices of exports,  which
are  generallv  deternined  by world supply and  demand  (see appendix).  Export  producers  now face
higher  input  and  labor  costs.  If there  are no export  subsidies  to offset the  anti-export  bias  of the
import  restrictions,  then  intervention  will produce  an inwardly  oriented  trade  regime.
5.1  trade  intensity  and  relative  price  dispersion
Outward  orientation  is usually  measured  as the  ratio  of trade  to  GDP  (see equations  1 and  2); a
higher share is thought  to indicate  an outwardly  oriented  regime.  Often  trade  share is adjusted  by
using  the  portion  of trade  not  predicted  by  "structural"  factors  such as income levels, area,  and
population  (equation  3).  A third  measure is Leamer's  measure of openness,  which equates  openness
with the  share of trade  not predicted  by differences in factor  endowments.  Negative  correlations  of
" The  ran kinug-  tit tahlE 4 for  fiot,a  na  Morocro.  antd  Timiui,a  are ba..edl  on  t  Iimlatioii  oi er tihe mnnre.tricted  sanmple.
Againi.  tli*  conntriev  ra  kitiip, are prt-pr% (l if  groiipe(l  wvih  ilit-ir  African  peer,  in  the  low  incoine caiegory:  Bots-vaia
,Iiows  1)w P(  qipi  nent liricr, . wvhikl Tit iiia  am  (l  lorocco  hownv Iiie(iiii  mquipmen  t  prirc'.
22Table  5:  Rank  Correlations  between  Relative  Price  Dispersion  and  Comnion  Measures  of Trade
Regime
Income  Categorv
Measure  Middle  High  Low
Openness  Trade  Share  18  -7  -20
Measures'  Adjusted  Trade  Share  37  -28  -9
Leamer  Openness  -24  -14  _
Intervention  Average Tariff  43  - -3
Measures  NTB  Coverage  13  4
Dollar (1990) Measure  -17  56  39
Price  Level  -24  -10  13
Leamer  (GDP)  -1  6  -
Leamer  (Trade  Share)  -60  -33
Leamer (R-squared)  .40  12
*  A negative  relationship  indicates  high price
dispersion  is associated  with low trade  share
price  dispersion  with these measures  would suggest  that  in general outward  oriented  economies  are
more liberal.
The rank  correlations  listed  in Table  5 reveal  the  relationship  to be more  complex.  While  the
three  measures  of openness  correspond  to low levels of price  dispersion  for  high  and  low income
countries,  the  relationship  is rather  weak.  With  the  exception  of the  Leamer  measure,  the  rela-
tionship  is reversed  in  the  case  of middle  income  countries;  economies  with  more  relative  price
dispersion  show higher  trade  shares  than  liberal  economies.  The  difference  between  the  Leamer
index  and  the  other  trade  shares  is to  be  expected,  given that  the  Leamer  index  is more  highly
correlated  with  the  raw trade  share  than  with  the "adjusted"  trade  share.
5.2  distortions  in  the  price  level  and  relative  price  dispersion
Comparisons with other measures  of outward  orientation  confirm these results.  As mentioned  above,
increases  in import  restrictions  can raise  the price  of import  substituting  goods  and  of nontraded
goods, biasing  production  against  exports  (see appendix).  These price increases  will be reflected  in
23the price level, converted into dollars at  the nominal exchange rate.  Comparisons of the  price level,
adjusted  for "structural"  differences in nontraded  goods prices,  can he used to construct  indices of
outward  orientation,  with a lower price level indicating  a moru outward  economy 10.
Comparisons of price dispersion with price-based openness measures  also suggest that  for middle
income countries,  economies  with more relativo price  dispersion  have louwe, price levels. Two price-
based  measures  of orientation  were used:  David  DoUar's (1991)  nieasure  based  on  a  sample  of
95 developing  countries  over the  period  1976-1985, and  a measure  drawn  from  a broader  sample
including developed economies froni 1965-1985. Both measures,  listed  in Table 5. confirni the earlier
iesult  that  interventionist  middle .ncome countries are also relatively more outward  oriented.  Again,
low and  high  income countries  show the  opposite  result;  high  intervention  implies relative  inward
orientation.
Table 6 plots relative  price dispersion against  the ten  year average of price overvaluation"l.  No
clear pattern  emerges,  as expected  given the correlations  described  above.  The table  does help  to
clear up  some anomalies:  Both Sri Lanka and  Peru  have very low price  levels, for example,  causing
them  to be considered  outward  oriented.  But  they  are definitely  not liberal;  they  have the  highest
measures  of price  dispersion  among  the middle income countries.
5.3  World  Bank  Measure  of  Outward  Orientation
If outward  orientation  is not  correlated  for  middle  income  countries  with  trade  intervention  as
measured  by  relative  price  dispersion,  then  what  is  to  be  made  of taxonomies  of  trade  regime
'0Sticii  nl,ua.IIres  ar(  .Ii)j('rt  t(,  lII0o%  %  1llv  fit (1  hal  lo lla  l  io  I  Iif itoliliial  exchiaiige  rate  (alat-(d  lM!  lv  iacroecoltoliiC
policies.  Sollle  attellihp is  tliadel  to  disel  ti  he  l  Oaslrf-  or  f  nioi,niI  ,challge  rate  dlianige  b%  a%eragillg  tlte ilea-sire
over  a period  of  ev-sral  vears  D  ee Dollar.  1!)!)ihi
"'  rne  a  erage  of  tl.e  p  rv0ou9  teli yea  r'  is highlb correlatedl  wit  llthe  val u  for  I )9t0  Somie  eonint  rie,  liadi 1  ttI prices
significantly  higher  or  lower  lianl tIheir  tell Year  averages  I efe IalHe lii
24Table  6:  Price  Level (Adjusted  Ten Year Average)  and  Relative  Price  Dispersion  Within  Income
Categories
see equation  4 and  Dollar (1990) for a description  of adjustment
Middle Income  C'ountries
Relative  Price  Dispersion
Price  Level  Low  Medium  H:gh
Low  Pakistan  Philippians  I truguay 2'
Ecuador  Peru-1l 
Chile  Sri Lanka-' 9
Colunmbia
Mlediuimi  Costa  Rica  Brazil- 14 Indonesia
Paraguay  El Salvador  Guatemala
Argentina49 Bolivia
High  Ireland' 2 Greece  Honduras
V'enezuela  Korea  Portugal
Dominican  Rep.-lo
Panama
UTpper  income  Countries




Mediumi  Austria  Norway
France  Luxembourg
Italy
High  Belgium  Denmark  Japan
Germany  Finland
Netherlands
Lower Income  Countriet
Low  Mali  2 2 Malawi  India
Madagascar  Ethiopia- 
26 _
Medium  Kenya  Zambia  Tanzania
Zimbabwe  Senegal  _
High  Ivory Coast  Cameroon  -Nigeria 1 8
The percent  deviation  of 1980 price  level from the ten year  average is given in the superscript
25which  combine  these  aspects  into  a single indicator?  The  1987 World  Development  Report  (pp.
82-83) argues  for  the  removal  of all  trade  barriers  based  on  links  between  growth  and  their  own
measure of trade  policy which have been questioned by other studies  (Helleiner, 1990, Singer, 1988).
This measure  combines orientation  with the degree of intervention  categorizing  countries  by "trade
orientation".  Categories  range  from "strongly  outward  oriented",  characterized  by very low trade
controls,  to  "strongly  inward  oriented",  in which the  incentive  structure  favors production  for the
domestic  market.
Table  7 reveals no  svstematic  relationship  between  what  the  Report  calls outward  orientation
and  relative  price dispersion;  inward oriented  countries show louwer  median dispersion  than  outward
oriented  countries.  Korea.  one of the only countries  to earn  the Bank's  label "strongly  outward  ori-
ented",  has a higher level of dispersion  than  Argentina  and the Dominican  Republic,  both  "strcngly
inward oriented"  countries.  Perhaps  unusually  high price levels reflecting overvalued exchange rates
in  these  two countries  qualify them  as inward oriented  despite  their  relative  lack of intervention;
but  Columbia,  El Salvador and Pakistan,  which are also classified as inward oriented,  all have lower
price  dispersion  than  Korea  and  moderate  price  levels.  Overall,  "inward  oriented"  countries  also
have lower median price levels than  "outward  oriented"  countries.  Based on the WDR's  orientation
index alone,  it seems that  liberalization  is not necessary  to achieve outward  orientation.
6  Comparisons  of  Relative  Price  Dispersion  with  other  Inter-
vention  Measures
Since it is now clear that  outward  orientation  is not svstematically  correlated  with  intervention  as
measured  by relative  price  dispersion,  it is worth  evaluating  other  measures  of trade  regime  which
26Table  7:  World Bank (1987) Measure  of Trade  Orientation  and  Relative  Price  Dispersion  Within
Income  Categories
-|_ iRelative  Price  Dispersion  l
World  Bank  Measure | Low  | Medium  | High
Outward  Oriented  Korea'
Moderately  Brazil  Israel
Outward  Oriented  ChileA
Uruguay
Moderately  Columbian  Guatemala  Honduras*
Inward  Oriented  Costa  Rica  Philippians  Indonesia
El Salvador  Sri Lanka A
Pakistan
Inward  Oriented  Argentina'  Peru,"  Bolivia
Doniinican
*  iniicates  high average price  level
A  indicates  high relative  equipment  prices
might  approximate  trade  intervention  more closely.
6.1  administrative  measures  and  relative  price  dispersion
If average  tariff  measures  and  NTB  coverage ratios  characterized  the  effects of intervention,  we
might  expect  to  see  them  correlated  with  relative  price  dispersion  in  the  traded  sector.  They're
not12. The  rank  correlation  between  NTB  coverage  ratios  and  price  dispersion  is low (13%  for
middle  income  countries  and 4% for low income countries;  see Table  5), but  at  least  it is positive.
The  same  is not  true  for  tariffs;  high  average  tariffs  are  seen in  countries  having  relatively  low
levels of price  dispersion.  This  suggests that  average tariff  levels are a poor indicator  of the  effects
of intervention.  As Helleiner  points  out  "moving  towards  neutrality  (by reducing  tariff)...is  not
evidently  "liberal"  if it is accompanied  by increasing overall dispersion of incentives."  (p.884)
12. Itl  oilgih t  e  Iiieasire,  a rt  roIIect  (-d bi  I N( T 'LD  for  t lf  !-ar  1X1<  o  oI COiijteietPn  inI t ra(le  polic  regime
over timiee  ix expected for  a majorit.%  of  comIIit  rif
276.2  revealed  quantity  measures  and  relative  price  dispersion
Leamer (1990) measures the absolute v. lue of cross-country deviations in trade patterns from those
predicted by factor endowments  in a Hecksher-Ohlin  model. Trade policy intervention is expected
to result in large deviations. In the absence of price controls. large distortions in trade patterns will
be accormpanied  by deviations in relative prices from world relative prices.  The price dispersion
measure was compared with three of Leaimer's  measures  of intervention: deviations relative to GDP,
deviations relative to predicted trade. and the percentage of trade unexplained by differences in
factor endowments (the r-squared measure).
None of the Leainer measures appear to be correlated with relative price dispersion (see Table 5).
The second measure in particular is highly negatively correlated with measures of price dispersion
within all income groups. The first measure, deviations relative to GDP, is only slightly positively
correlated for low income countries. The r-squared measure is slightly positively correlated within
the high income group, but  significantly negatively correlated with intervention for the middle
income group. The poor performance  of these indices is not surprising; by Leamer's own admission,
"the first criticism of the model is that it does not explain the trade of many countries very well."
7  Conclusion
The index of relative price dispersion developed here has the advantage that it is objective, that  it
measures intervention not just in imports but in exports as well, that it is comiparable  across coun-
tries, and is independent of exchange rate fluctuations caused by macroeconomic  mismanagement.
Unlike average tariffs, NTB measures,  and price level measures, the relative price dispersion index
measures incentive distortions uwithin  categories of goods. While the Leamer index looks directly
28at  the  effects of trade  policy  intervention,  the  theoretical  assumptions  required  to  calculate  the
pattern  of trade  in the  absence  of distortion  are  questionable.  Such assumptions  are  unnecessary
when calculating  relative  price dispersion,  since world prices are directly  observable.
Comparisons  of relative  price  dispersion  with  commonly  used  outward  orientation  measures
reveal that  the relationship  between "openness"  and trade  liberalization  is more complicated  than  is
often believed.  Not only is it hazardous  to characterize a inward oriented  countries as interventionist
and  outward  oriented  countries  as liberal,  but  the  characterization  is simply  wrong for developing
countries.
Whether  a countrv  i..(ervenes  does not tell the  whole story  about  a country's  trade  policy, and
miiisses  an  essential  aspect  of intervention:  which  goods  are  favored  by  subsidies  and  which  are
protected  by tariffs.  Indonesia  and  Peru,  for example,  have comparable  measures  of intervention,
b-it  the  relative  price  of equipment  is  very  high  in  Peru  and  very  low  in  Indonesia;  consumer
nondurables  appear  to  flow freely in  Latin  America,  while  prices  for  these  goods  in  Japan  and
Korea  are inexplicably  high.  ITnderstanding differences in the  growth experience  of these  countries
clearly  requires  a more  subtle  view of trade  policy than  "outward"  and  "inward  oriented",  as well
as a more informed  understanding  of the  nature  of intervention.
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31Appendix
8  Equilibrium  Trade  Policy  Model
Common measures of outward orientation include the share of trade in GDP and the price level 13;
if a country has a low price level or a high trade share, it is considered outward oriented.  These
measures of outward orientation are often used to assess a country's degree of trade policy inter-
vention, with low measures of outward orientation indicating an interventionist regime and high
measures indicating a liberal regime.
I will illustrate the relationship between outward orientation and trade intervention more care-
fully with an Australian general equilibrium niodel with three goods: imports, exports, an.  non-
traded goods" 4. I will be concerned with intervention which raises the average  level of the import
tariff, export subsidy, or export tax.  A high trade share and a low price level are consistent with
trade  policy intervention in long run equilibrium (i.e.  domestic full employment and  balanced
trade) if intervention takes the form of import tariffs. The relationship breaks down if intervention
in the export sector is allowed: with a tax on exports, a low price level is consistent with high
intervention; if exports are subsidized,  high intervention can result in a low trade share. If export
intervention is allowed, price level measures also fail as measures of outward orientation; export
subsidies can lead to a high price level while  biasing trade toward exports.
13(  eierv.  a  ionig ot lhrs.  uses I ra,l  -hare a(d  jii-ted  for  tr1irt  ral rro-.-coitnit  r%  (l ifFfreircei-'  [olla  r,  i !tl)I  constructs
an ind(lex of  on. ward  orieit  ationt  Ia.ed  uti  the  price le  el. al-o  ad.jinited  for  cro>s-coiiii  r%  rio  tinra  diftlereitceq
14cee Dornbuschl  (  ¶!9IM  I  for  a conijilete  dhi,ci-on  of  tfie  A iitralian  model
328.1  Production
All three  goods are produced  by the doniestic economy with fixed capital  together  with  labor  which
is mobile  across sectors  but  in fixed supply  L* for the  economy.  Import  goods are  both  produced
at  home and  imported  from the world market.  Export  goods are both  consitmed domestically  and
exported  abroad.  Labor  is allocated  over  the  three  sectors  such that  the  value  of its  marginal
product  is equal  in each sector
(1  4- q)  AIPx(Lx)  (1 4- e) -MPrMf(LM) = F.v  1MPiv(LN)  (15)
where  MIP 2 (L,)  is  the  (dinminishing) marginal  product  in  sector  i as a  function  of labor  Li  (the
subscript  X  denotes  exportables.  .1  importables,  and  N  nontraded  goods).  Since I  will not  be
considering  terms  of trade  effects, the  world price  of importables  is assumed  to equal  the  world
price  of exportables,  which is normalized  to equal one.  The  domestic  price of imports  differs from
the  world price  by the amount  of the import  tariff e, and  the  domestic  price of exportables  differs
from the world price by the amount  of the export  subsidy s.  Production  in each sector is determined
from equation  15 given the  total  labor  supply  L':
Q'(  PN  PJV  i = (N,  X,M11)  (16)
such that
1+E  14-  I  1+Ec  1s
7-)  ><0 1+l  PA  s  1+E  )IV(  4-sP  ) 
QX1( PN  m  ,v  <  C  QX2( P  -)>0  (17)
33NP+  + s  I  +N QMI( P_  ,  P  ) > O  QM2( TN  PN  ) <  O
where all  goods are denominated  in international  currency.
8.2  Demand
Consumers  value  nontraded  goods,  importables,  and  exportables  according  to  the  Cobb-Douglas
utility  function
l'  C C,3c-(1-3)C(I-,P)(1-i3)  (18)
where C, is consumption  of good i.  Consumer maximization  gives the following demand  functions:
PN  DN  =  3E
(i  + s).  DX  =  -y(1  - ,3)E  (19)
(1 +f)  DM = (1-  y)(1  - O)E
where  E  is expenditure  in  dollars.  From  the  demand  functions  given in  equation  19 consumers
choose their  purchases  such that  expenditures  remain  constant  for each good.
8.3  Domestic  Market  Equilibrium
The market  for nontraded  goods is always assumed  to be in equilibrium  (full employment  is always
obtained).  The price  of nontraded  goods is determined  by the  interaction  of supply  (equation  16)
and  demand  (equation  19) in the  nontraded  sector; the  nontraded  price  is that  which equilibrates
demand  at  a given  level of expenditure  with  supply, determined  by  the  incentives  to  produce  in
34the  nontraded  sector  relative  to the  traded  sectors.  The domestic  market  equilibrium  condition  is
given by
D±QPN  PN  (20)
Substituting  nontraded  demand  (equation  19) into equation  20 gives
1e  1 +  s
PN  QN  -T-VPN  )E(21)
Equation  21 implicitly  defines the  expenditure  and  nontraded  price  combinations  for a given level
of trade  intervention  (e and  s).  The  characteristics  of this  scheduile are derived  using  the  implicit
function  theorem
6PN  3  d  >  0  (22)
6E  QN  - (d)QN1  -I  (  )QN2
PN  1+)  (W)QNI  >  0  <  1  (23)
b(1  + e)  PN  (3)QNI  +  (i)QN2-QN
'(IN  +)(P)  ()QN  - > 0  <  1  (24)
6(l  ±  )  PN'  (1p A)QN2 + ( jN)QN1  QN
Figure  1 shows the schedule relating  expenditures  to  nontraded  goods to slope upwards,  as in
equation  22.  An increase  in expenditure  causes excess demand  for nontraded  goods.  Nontraded
price  rises  to  ration  the  excess  demand,  decreasing  the  quantity  demanded  and  increasing  the
quantity  produced.
An increase in the import  tariff or an increase  in export  subsidy shifts the schedule upwards  but
by less than  the  amount  of the change  in the  policy measure  (equations  23 and  24).  An increase
in  the  tariff  or  subsidy  results  in excess  demand  for  nontraded  goods,  as production  is diverted
towards  the  traded  sectc.r.  The  nontraded  price  increases  to  ration  the  excess demand,  but  the
35necessary  price  increase  is less than  the  increase  in  the  tariff;  since the  increase  in  the  nontrade(d
price  lowers the  quantity  of nontraded  goods  demanded,  less of a  supply  response  is required  to
equilibrate  the domestic  market.
8.4  Trade  Balance
Trade  is assumed  to  balance  in  the  long run.  Trade  balance  is achievpd when  the  world  value of
exports  equals  the  world value of excess dcemand  for imports
QX(-.  '  - DX  =  Dj!  - Qm(  p  S  (25)
Substituting  the  demand  functions  from equation  19 into
equation  25 gives
Qx  1  E - QA  (26)
Equation  26 gives the  schedule of nontraded  price-expenditure  combinations  which  achieve trade
balance  comparable  to  equation  21 for  the  domestic  market.  The properties  of this  schedule  are
derived  using  the implicit  function  theorem
6PAI  -~~~~(1-13)  ±  1y(-3 6PNv  I+.I  1+e  < 0  (27)
bE  - (')(QXI  + QM1)  + (W)(QX2  t  QAM2)
6 PN  1 + S  (N)(QXI  I  QM1)
_  _  _  (=QI  >0  <)1  (28)
*(11+  )  PN  (L.*)(QXI  + QM1)  + (p2)(QX2  + QA12)
6PN  1 + S  (PN  )(Q.X2  +  QMA2) . _  - > 0  < 1  (29)
6(1 + S)  PN  )(QXI  + QMI)  f (1p2 )(QX2 + QM2)
36By  equation  27 the  trade  balance  schedule slopes downward;  an increase  in expenditures  reduces
the  trade  balance  by  raising  the  demand  for imports  while lowering the  supply  of exports.  The
nontraded  price  must  fall to shift demand  away fromn  tradables  and  supply  toward  tradables.
An  increase  in  E or s  shifts  the  trade  balance  schedule  up  (equations  28 and  29);  a  tariff
induced  increase  in the  price of importables  increases  production  of importables  while decreasing
demand,  causing a t:ade  surplus.  Trade is balanced with an increase in the nontraded  price,  shifting
production  toward  nontraded  goods.  The price increase  simultaneously  shifts  demand  away from
nontraded  goods towards  imports,  so the increase in the nontraded  price  required  for trade  balance
is less than  the increase  in the  tariff.
Equations  21 and  26 determine  the  unique  nontraded  price  and  expenditure  level consistent
with  both  domestic  equiilibrium and  trade  balance,  shown in figure 2.  An increase  in e or  s  leads
to  an  increase  in  the  price  of nontraded  goods consistent  with  long run  equilibrium.  If the  real
exchange  rate  is defined  to  be  the  world price  of tradables  (the  expenditure  weighted  average  of
the  price  of importables  and  exportables)  over the  domestic  price  of nontradables,  an  increase  in
intervention  in the form of an increase  in t or s leads to a sustainable  appreciation  of the exchange
rate 1 5.
An increase  in the  import  tariff or  export  subsidy  also increases  the  equilibrium  expenditure;
the  upward  shift  in  the  trade  balance  curve exceeds  the  shift  in the  domestic  equilibrium  cl rve.
Demonstrating  this requires  deriving the relationship  between price responses  of output  of the three
'naltt  rinate  definitiioni  of t il  [  al  v  xrlim  nPe  rate  is I lie domesttc  price  of t radanhis  o%  er t he-  i,out  raded  price. The
on  (lefiinit  iois arn  idleiitical  if t  here  are  nto  t  rade  harriers.
37goods from the foUowing labor  demand  conditions
dLX  dLp.s  dLm
de  ( de  t  de  )  ~~~~~~~(30)
dLX  dLN  dL  A  .
ds  ds9  ds
Combine  equations  30 and  15 with the  condition  that  the derivative  of the  supply  of good  i with
respect  to policy measure  j  is given by Q,j  = llp,  *  dL  , to get the following ielationships  between
output  responses  to  changes in policy measures  (let  s and  e  be zero initially)
QXI  -(PNQNI  + QAI1)  (31)
Qx2  =  -(PNQN2  +  QM2)
Substituting  equation  31 into the trade  balance  conditions  (equations  28 and  29) gives
6PN  1 +  +  P)QN1  (32  )
BPS  (1  +S)  (N)QN2  (33
6(1 + S)  PN  (Q  )QN2  + (  W  )QN1
The shift in the trade  balance schedule with a shift in trade  policy in equations  32 and 33 are larger
than  the shift  in the  domestic  equilibrium  schedule  (equations  23 and  24).  In fact,  the  change  in
expenditure  with  respect  to policy measure  pi can be shown to  be
dE  Q  dPN  (3)
8dp
38The  larger  shift implies expenditure  must increase  in equilibrium  in response  to an  increase  in the
import  tariff  or export  subsidy.
9  Trade  Policy  Intervention  and  Outward  Orientation
The  model  can be used to predict  the  impact  of various forms of trade  policy intervention  on two
standard  measures  of outward  orientation:  the trade  as a share of total  output,  and  the price level.
A low trade  share  or a high  price level are interpreted  as indications  of inward orientation.
9.1  Share  of  Trade  in  GDP
Equation  25  gives the  trade  balance  ccndition  for  the  economy.  since  exports  equal  imports  in
trade  balance  and  output  equals  expenditures,  the  share  of trade  in output  will move identicaly
with  the  ratio  of exports  (or  imporfs)  to expenditures,  defined below
T=  Qx  - Dx  (35)
E
Combining  equation  35 with  demand  in equation  ,9 gives
T = QEx-  (1 -3)  (36)
Trade  policy intervention  will be  correlated  with outward  orientation  if (in the  absence  of export
measures)  increasing  the import  tariff  e lowers the  trade  share.  The change in T  with a  change in
the import  tariff is found by  differentiating  equation  36 with r-spect  to  E
dT  _  dQx  1  dEQx
dE  deE  de  E2 (3)
39Changes  in  e affect  Qx  in two ways:  the  direct  effect of increases  in  f  on  output  in  the  export
sector,  and  the indirect  effect of changes in e on the  equilibrium  price of nontraded  goods.  The net
effect is given in equation  38
dQx  I 
PN((1  - 77)QXI-  77-QQX2)  <  0  (38)
where i7  is derived  from equations  23 and  28
dPN  e
11f  =  d  ( P  )  > 0  < 1  (39)
de  PN
Since  d  is positive  by the argument  in section 8.4, the  derivative  dTis  negative,  and  trade  inter-
vention  results  in a lower trade  share and inward  orientation.
By changing  relative  prices between the  three  goods, import  restrictions  bias production  away
from  exportables  and  towards  importables;  the  Has  hurts  exports,  which  sell at  the  same  world
price, by increasing the price export producers pay for their facto- of production.  Export  production
declines while import  production  increases.  With  a steady demand  for exportables  and importables,
the  result  is a decline in trade.
The  link between  policy intervention  and  low trade  share  does not  hold  when  intervention  is
allowed  to  take  the  form of an export  subsidy.  Differentiating  the  export  share  of expenditures
with respect  to the  subsidy  s gives
dT  dQx  1  dE,  x
ds  ds(  E'  ds(  E2 (4)
40The first  term  in equation  40 expands  to
dQx  1  1  QX2  E  QX1)  > 0  (41)
ds(E~  E  PN-s~'
where  r7,, comparable  to  qe given in equation  39, is greater  than  zero and  less than  one.
Since  dE  =  PMNSQN  from equation  34, the second term  in equation  40 can be expressed
dE  Qy  3?.  (42)
ds  E2 )E  s
Restating  the  first and  second terms,  equation  40 simplifies to
dT  Q i  dQX  s dT  ( Qx6)(-Q  5  - 2  -37)  (43)
ds  sE  ds,  Qx  (3
Equation  43 shows that  the trade  share can  increase with trade  intervention  in the export  sector,
provided  the  net  elasticity  of the export  supply  'a response  to  the  subsidy exceeds o 31i,, a number
between  zero and  one.
9.2  Price  Level
Price  level is often  used as a  measure  of outward  orientation,  where  a  high  price  level indicates
an  inward  oriented  economy  (Dollar,  1990).  The  model  clarifies the  link  between  trade  policy
intervention  and  outward  orientation  in  an  economy  in  long  run  equilibrium.  The  price level
increases with  intervention  and  outward  orientation  if intervention  takes place in the import  sector.
If intervention  in exports  are allowed, the price  level fails both  as a measure  of intervention  and  as
a measure  of outward  orientation;  the price level can decline, for example,  in response  to an export
41tax  which biases  trade  against  exports.
A price index  for the economy is derived  from the utility  function  in equation  18 to be
P  =  PN(1  + S)"('  )(1  +  E)(1  Y)(l-(4
The change  in the price  level with a  change in the import  tariff is
dP  PIV-  i=  7f + (I  - 7)(1  - 13  >  0  (45)
d(1 +E6)  l+E-
Equation  45 indicates  that  trade  policy intervention  in the  form of import  tariffs causes  the  price
level to  increase  in  long  run  equilibriuni.  The  tariff  increases  import  prices  both  directly  and
indirectly  by increasing nontraded  goods prices, the indirect effect in response  to the supply shortage
in the  nontraded  goods sector caused  by increased  production  of importables.  With  import  tarifts
alone,  a high price  level indicates  intervention  and  inward orientation.
The  link  between  intervention  and  a high  price  level is broken  if intervention  takes  the  form
of an export  tax;  a  decline in the  export  subsidy  will lead to  a  decrease  in  the  nontraded  goods
price  as well as a  decrease  in  the  price of exports.  This  low price  level is sustainable  in long  run
equilib.ium  with  balanced  trade  and  domestic  equilibrium.  The  change in  the price  level with  a
change in the  export  tax  is
dP  P dP  (PN_)= 13?1  + '(l  - l3)  > 0  (46)
d(  + s)  1 +s
A positive  derivative  indicates  an  increase  in the  export  tax  (a decrease  in s)  will cause a decline
in the price  level which is consistent  with  long run  equilibrium.
42Not only  does the fall in the  price  level fail to capture  intervention,  but  the fall  coexists  with
a  decline  in  the incentives  to  export  relative  to  import  substitute;  the  import  price  is stationary
relative  to a  fall in the  export  price  which exceeds the  fall in  the price  of nontraded  goods  (t7, is
less then  one).  Both  the impott  price  The  price level in  this  case fails to reliably  measure  either
trade  policy intervention  or outward  orientation
In the  absence  of export  subsides or taxes,  the model justifies  the  use of trade  share  and  price
level  as  measures  of both  outward  orientation  (the  incentive  to  produce  for  export  relative  to
producing  import  substitutes)  as well as measures  of trade  policy intervention.  Intervention  taking
the  form  of import  restrictions  will bias  production  against  exports,  reduce  trade  as  a  share  of
income, and  increase  the  price ievel.
The model's  predictions  of the impact  of import  restrictions  differ if intervention  causes export
prices to  deviate  from world prices.  An export  subsidy  can raise  the  share of trade  to  GDP,  even
in long run  equilibrium;  the  subsidy  could be large  enough  to offset the  impact  of a tariff  on  the
trade  share,  causing  a country  to be considered outward  oriented  while maintaining  a  high level of
intervention.  An export  tax  can be used to offset the impact  of an import  tariff  on the  price level,
both  by decreasing  the price of exportables  directly, and  by lowering the nontraded  goods  price by
increasing  the excess supply  of goods in  the nontraded  sector.  If price level were used to  measure
trade  policy, a country  with an  export  tax  having  a low price  level would be wrongly  considered
liberal  and  outward  oriented.
43Table  8: Relative  Price  Dispersion  Estimates  for the Restricted  Sample
vj=E  aijtfl?j
The  variable  %ijis  the  residual  from the  estimation  of equation  10.
All variables  are explained  in the  text  describing  equation  13.
Rank  Country  Dispersion
I  Austria  0.00495
2  Italy  0.0118
3  France  0.01340
4  Belgium  0.01640
5  Netherlands  0.01684
6  Germany  0.01893
7  Luxembourg  0.01971
8  Norwav  0.02178
9  Pakistan  0.02507
10  Denmark  0.0271
11  Costa  Rica  0.0296
12  United  Kingdom  0.0319
13  Dominican  Republic  0.0323
14  Paraguay  0.03247
15  Argentina  0.03582
16  Canada  0.03584
17  PanamrLa  0.03724
18  Venezuela  0.03735
19  Ireland  0.03857
20  El Salvador  0.04157
21  Colombia  0.04182
22  Finland  0.04390
23  Greece  0.0460
24  Korea  0.04961
25  Philippines  0.0521
26  Ecuador  0.05301
27  Brazil  0.05458
28  Spain  0.05538
29  Chile  0.05552
30  Peru  0.06002
31  Guatemala  0.06058
32  Uruguay  0.06078
33  Honduras  0.07488
34  Indonesia  0.07968
35  Portugal  0.08282
36  Bolivia  0.08637
37  Sri Lanka  0.1021
38  Israel  0.1118
39  Japan  0.1368Table  9:  Relative  Price Dispersion  Estimates  for the  Unrestricted  Sample
The  variable  i 1ijis the residual  from the estimation  of equation  10.
AU variables  are explained  in the  text  describing  equation  13.
Rank  C'ountry  Dispersion
1  Austria  0.00587
2  Belgium  0.01027
3  Italy  0.01035
4  France  0.01073
5  Netherlands  0.01530
6  NIorocco  0.01637
7  Germany  0.01667
8  Luxembourg  0.01686
9  Mladagascar  0.01843
10  Kenya  0.02111
11  Norway  0.02163
12  Pakistan  0.02200
13  Mali  0.02504
14  Ivory Coast  0.02863
15  Canada  0.02871
16  Zimbabwe  0.02882
17  United  Kingdom  0.03006
18  Senegal  0.03169
19  Dominican  Rep  0.03210
20  Deninark  0.03287
21  Uruguay  0.03465
22  Panama  0.03631
23  Costa Rica  0.03746
24  Malawi  0.03784
25  Finland  0.03891
26  El Salvador  0.04023
27  Paraguay  0.04184
28  Argentina  0.04244
29  Spain  0.04320
30  Ireland  0.04324
31  Greece  0.04757
32  Ethiopia  0.05030
33  Ecuador  0.05194
34  Brazil  0.05389
35  Cameroon  0.05406
36  Colombia  0.06131
37  Korea  0.06195
38  Honduras  0.06266
45Table  10: Relative  Price  Dispersion  Estimates  for the  Unrestricted  Sample  (Continued)
Rank  Country  Dispersion
39  Philippines  0.06380
40  Portugal  0.06544
41  Tanzania  0.06579
42  Chile  0.06652
43  India  0.06701
44  Tunisia  0.07040
45  Peru  0.07475
46  Zambia  0.07854
47  Guatemala  0.08147
48  Indonesia  0.08371
49  Nigeria  0.09466
50  Israel  0.09659
51  Venezuela  0.1050
52  Japan  0.11737
53  Bolivia  0.12348
54  Botswana  0.12463
55  Sri Lanka  0.17082
46Table  11: Equipment  Price  Distortion  Estimates
Vj=  Ea  ijfj 
The variable  i4jis  the residual  from the estimation  of equation  10.
AU variables  are explained  in the  text  describing  equation  13.
Rank  Country  Dispersion
I  Botswana  -0.11770
2  Zambia  -0.06031
3  Korea  -0.05260
4  Japan  -0.04826
5  Israel  -0.03521
6  Nigeria  -0.03335
7  Denmark  -0.0296
8  Tanzania  -0.02890
9  Indonesia  -0.02511
10  Finland  -0.02382
11  Norway  -0.02382
12  Portugal  -0.02227
13  Zimbabwe  -0.02178
14  Canada  -0.02144
15  Greece  -0.02139
16  Honduras  -0.01867
17  Ireland  -0.00937
18  Kenya  -0.00888
19  Bolivia  -0.0069
20  Pakistan  -0.0057
21  Malawi  -0.00529
22  Uruguay  -0.00525
23  Philippines  -0.00440
24  Venezuela  -0.00368
25  Paraguay  -0.00321
26  Panama  -0.00219
27  Tunisia  -0.00102
28  Ethiopia  -0.00074
29  El Salvador  0.00185
30  Morocco  0.00499
31  Ivory Coast  0.00650
32  Costa Rica  0.00715
33  United  Kingdom  0.00752
34  Cameroon  0.00763
35  Austria  0.00832
36  Italy  0.00904
37  Brazil  0.01019
38  India  0.01064
39  Senegal  0.01171Table  12: Equipment  Price  Distortion  Estimates  (Continued)
Rank  Country  Dispersion
40  Luxembourg  0.01400
41  Germany  0.01435
42  Spain  0.01503
43  Ecuador  0.01621
44  Belgium  0.01723
45  Guatemala  0.01972
46  France  0.02109
47  Peru  0.02234
48  Dominican  Rep  0.02275
49  Argentina  0.02492
50  Netherlands  0.02754
51  Chile  0.02951
52  Colombia  0.0320
53  Madagascar  0.03203
54  Mali  0.04006
55  Sri Lanka  00.05301
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